



Marc Ravalomanana, Andry Rajoelina & Niels Marquardt

On ne s'enrichit pas sur le dos de l'Histoire de l'Humanité. Par contre, celle-ci enrichit l'homme informé de la vérité historique. Car il n'existe qu'une vérité. Le reste n'est qu'interprétations selon les intérêts de leurs auteurs. Chaque action procède. Aujourd'hui, tout le monde fait semblant d'oublier pourquoi le peuple malgache s'est levé contre Marc Ravalomanna, comme il s'est levé contre Philibert Tsiranana et Didier Ratsiraka. Qui sont les personnages qui entravent l'émancipation même d'une Nation anciennement colonisée ?

1972, 1991, 2001. Il n'y avait pas Internet. Toutes les transitions passées n'ont eu l'actuel imbroglio tournant toujours sur un retour de Ravalomanana considéré comme le sauveur de la patrie. Face à ces inepties -issues pourtant de Malgaches ultra-diplômés-, une seule démarche pour rétablir la vérité. Il faut remercier, ici, Julian Assange qui, à travers son réseau Wikileaks, a permis d'aller au centre des secrets les mieux gardés. C'est-à-dire là où se dégage cette vérité que beaucoup s'obstinent à corrompre.

Que celles et ceux qui s'intéressent sincèrement au devenir de Madagascar, fassent la traduction des câbles sur Madagascar qui suivent (il y en a d'autres). La vérité s'en dégage et il n'y a aucune interprétation possible. Madagate.com vous présente donc les racines de la chute de Marc Ravalomanana. Avec cela, il est possible d'anticiper l'avenir au lieu de passer toute une vie à raconter n'importe quoi.

Madagascar: Gom (again) Denies Daewoo Land Deal

Embassy Antananarivo (Madagascar)

Fri, 19 Dec 2008 09:14 UTC

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RUEHAN #0852 3540914

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AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

1886 INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS ANTANANARIVO 000852

SIPDIS STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV

REF: ANTANANARIVO 787 E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: GOM (AGAIN) DENIES DAEWOO LAND DEAL

1. (U) The following diplomatic note dated December 12 was delivered to Post in response to

recent media reports concerning a major agricultural investment by South Korea's Daewoo Logistics (reftel). The story was reported on extensively in both foreign and domestic media despite an immediate denial from the GOM, and continues to provoke speculation in the Malagasy and international press. This note was provided to further clarify the GOM's position.

2. (U) BEGIN TEXT : MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
GENERAL DIRECTION OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATION Office in charge of Cooperation
with Asia and Pacific No. 08-2438/AE/M/NV

DIPLOMATIC NOTE The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Madagascar presents its compliments to ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS in Antananarivo and, pursuant to the information stated by the international media, namely "The Financial Times", concerning the alleged real estate rental contract on 3 million hectares between the Government of Madagascar and Daewoo Logistics, has the honor to provide hereafter an official denial by the Government of Madagascar on this issue: "The information affirming the signature of a contract of purchase of estate in Madagascar by the Korean company Daewoo is false. Indeed, Daewoo Logistics has expressed interest, just like any investor, in investing in agribusiness in Madagascar, for large scale farming of corn and production of palm oil. As a result, a Memorandum of Understanding on the project was signed for the purpose of land prospecting, at the end of which a report should be submitted, followed by studies and analyses of compliance with the draft project. Once the results of the studies comply with the needs of the Government of Madagascar, the regulatory procedures related to the application to rent an estate should be initiated. In case there is no objection to the procedures, a contract for a long-term lease shall be signed for the profit of the requestor in exchange for the payment of an annual fee determined on the basis of the geographic location of the zone requested, after approval issued during a Cabinet Meeting. As to Daewoo Logistics, the procedure performed to date remains at the level of land prospecting, and no report, decision or lease contract has been submitted to or signed by the Malagasy party. Therefore, the information stated related to the signature of a contract and the free allocation of an estate is false. Finally, the press release from Daewoo Logistics denying the allocation of any land, and the official denial by the Malagasy Ministry of Land Reform, State Property and Development of Territory, are both accessible on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' web site. Antananarivo, December 12, 2008.

END TEXT.

2. (SBU) EMBASSY COMMENT: The "Affaire Daewoo" continues to reverberate here and abroad, mainly for the enormous scale of the project initially - and evidently quite prematurely - announced by Daewoo in November. Most observers here take the GOM denials at face value,

and attribute the whole matter to Daewoo's extreme naivete in having concluded that a permit to look around for land here was anything more than the beginning of a long and still very uncertain process. Still, Madagascar does have great expanses of available, arable land, and official policy is to open it for development, including by foreign investors. This incident may have drawn useful international attention to these long-term opportunities, while also highlighting the domestic political sensitivities to foreign control of local land and the need to - unlike Daewoo - move forward with discretion.

End comment.

MARQUARDT

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Diplomatic Effort Reveals Full-blown Malagasy Political Crisis

Origin Embassy Antananarivo (Madagascar)

Cable time Fri, 23 Jan 2009 09:45 UTC

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

O 230945Z JAN 09

FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2007

INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

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HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP PRIORITY

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000060 E.O. 12958:

DECL: 01/23/2019

**SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC EFFORT REVEALS FULL-BLOWN MALAGASY POLITICAL
CRISIS**

Classified By: **AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT**

1. (C) SUMMARY. DIPLOMATS MET ON JANUARY 22 FIRST WITH ANTANANARIVO MAYOR ANDRY "TGV" RAJOELINA AND IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER TO SEEK COMMON GROUND THAT MIGHT CALM THE WORSENING POLITICAL CRISIS IN MADAGASCAR. THE TWO DISCUSSIONS, EACH LASTING ABOUT TWO HOURS, REVEALED A FAR GREATER DEGREE OF POLARIZATION AND RISK OF CONFRONTATION THAN HAD BEEN EVIDENT BEFORE. THE MAYOR, FOR HIS PART, HAS ASSUMED A BROAD, SELF-APPOINTED, AND UNCOMPROMISING ROLE AS POPULIST LEADER OF THE NATION'S ENTIRE POPULATION -- WHICH HE CLAIMS IS OVERWHELMINGLY FED UP WITH RAVALOMANANA'S CORRUPT LEADERSHIP -- AND HE OPENLY STATED THAT HIS GOAL IS REGIME CHANGE VIA A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND SOME SORT OF REFERENDUM REVEALING THE TRUE EXTENT OF POPULAR DISCONTENT. TGV SEEMED UNINTERESTED IN FINDING COMMON GROUND AND MAY HAVE PASSED A POINT OF NO RETURN IN HIS SOURED RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT. THE TWO MINISTERS, FOR THEIR PARTS, CLEARLY SEE THE EXTREME DANGERS INVOLVED AS THE MAYOR CALLS FOR ANOTHER UNAUTHORIZED PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION THIS SATURDAY. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE MAYOR IS BEING MANIPULATED BY EX-RATSIRAKA LOYALISTS AND EVEN BY THE EXILED FORMER PRESIDENT HIMSELF FROM PARIS, AND DO NOT SEE THE MAYOR AS A TRUSTWORTHY OR LEGITIMATE PARTNER IN A NEGOTIATION THEY CLAIM TO HAVE BEEN SEEKING, IN VAIN, FOR SOME TIME. THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION BEING EXPLOITED BY AN UNNAMED, UNSEEN "THIRD COLUMN" WHO MIGHT SPARK VIOLENCE OR EVEN KILL THE MAYOR IN AN EFFORT TO CREATE 2002-LIKE CONDITIONS IN THE STREETS OF THE CAPITAL. THE DIPLOMATS WERE UNITED IN SENDING SOBERING MESSAGES TO BOTH SIDES THAT WE ALSO SEE THE SITUATION AS EXPLOSIVE, THAT A COMMITMENT TO NON-VIOLENCE IS KEY, THAT ALL SIDES NEED TO STEP BACK AND AVOID INADVERTENTLY SPARKING VIOLENCE, AND THAT ANY RESORT TO EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS WILL BE MET BY PARTNER GOVERNMENTS WITH CONDEMNATION AND A LIKELY SUSPENSION OF ASSISTANCE NEEDED BY THE MALAGASY PEOPLE, THE PRESIDENT, FOR HIS PART, LEFT TODAY FOR SOUTH AFRICA (FOR AN EXTRAORDINARY SADC SUMMIT ON ZIMBABWE NOT TO BE HELD UNTIL MONDAY), THUS DELIBERATELY ABSENTING HIMSELF FROM MADAGASCAR FOR THIS COMING WEEKEND. HE APPEARS TO BE WILLING TO RECEIVE AMBASSADORS IMMEDIATELY AFTER HIS RETURN TO HEAR OUR THOUGHTS AND DISCUSS POSSIBLE CALMING MEASURES. HOWEVER, THE SITUATION COULD HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED BY THEN. WE AND THE FRENCH, AND PERHAPS OTHERS, ARE ISSUING UPDATED WARDEN MESSAGES IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE. END SUMMARY.

(C) 2. (C) I JOINED MY EU, GERMAN, UNDP AND NORWEGIAN COUNTERPARTS ON THURSDAY NIGHT IN A TWO-HOUR MEETING AT THE EU RESIDENCE WITH 'TANA MAYOR TGV. (NOTE: FRANCE AND SOUTH ARICA WERE ALSO ASSOCIATED WITH AND

AWARE OF THIS INITIATIVE BUT UNABLE TO ATTEND.

END NOTE.) THIS FOLLOWED A SUGGESTION FROM FORMER PRIME MINISTER AND CURRENT NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT JACQUES SYLLA THAT AN OUTSIDE EFFORT FROM RESIDENT DIPLOMATS TOWARD BOTH TGV AND THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE WELCOME AND PERHAPS EFFECTIVE IN CALMING DOWN A DANGEROUSLY ESCALATING POLITICAL SITUATION HERE. SYLLA CONFIRMED THIS VIEW IN A TETE-A-TETE WITH ME ON THURSDAY MORNING, DURING WHICH HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE IN MALAGASY CULTURE OF MAINTAINING OPEN DIALOGUE AND RESPECTFUL RELATIONS -- BOTH SEVERELY FRAYED AFTER WEEKS OF HARDENING PUBLIC RHETORIC BETWEEN THE MAYOR'S CAMP AND THE GOVERNMENT. TGV CAME TO THE MEETING ALONE AND LAUNCHED THE DISCUSSION WITH A LENGTHY CATALOGUE OF GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE PRESIDENT AND THE GOVERNMENT, ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION, RECITATIONS OF WRONGS AGAINST HIM IN HIS ROLE AS MAYOR, AND CLAIMS THAT HE IS NOW THE UNDISPUTED LEADER OF BOTH THE OPPOSITION AND THE DISAFFECTED MAJORITY OF THE MALAGASY POPULATION WHO HAVE HAD IT WITH RAVALOMANANA. MANY OF HIS COMPLAINTS HAVE SOME BASIS IN FACT, ALTHOUGH IT IS ENTIRELY UNCLEAR HOW MANY MALAGASY ARE SUFFICIENTLY UNHAPPY AS TO WISH A RETURN TO A 2002-STYLE PUBLIC CONFRONTATION OR REALLY WANT OR EXPECT IMMEDIATE REGIME CHANGE.

3. (C) TGV CLAIMED, HOWEVER, THAT THE MAJORITY WANT RAVALOMANANA OUT NOW, AND DEFINED AS HIS OBJECTIVE IMMEDIATE REGIME CHANGE VIA A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD COME TO POWER THROUGH SOME UNDEFINED POPULAR REFERENDUM AGAINST RAVALOMANANA'S RULE. ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT WOULD GO ALONG WITH SUCH A PLAN, TGV ADMITTED THAT HE WOULD NOT. WE DIPLOMATS THEN TOOK TURNS EXPLAINING THE UNACCEPTABLE NATURE OF EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS AND THE LIKELY NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY FOLLOW, USING RECENT EVENTS IN GUINEA AND MAURITANIA AS EXAMPLES. TGV WAS UNMOVED AND ONLY RATCHETED UP HIS POPULIST RHETORIC ABOUT THE SUFFERING OF THE MALAGASY PEOPLE AND REITERATING HIS OVER-REACHING DEMANDS THAT CERTAIN MINISTERS BE FIRED, THAT THE PRESIDENT SELL HIS RECENTLY-ACQUIRED PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT, ETC. I ASKED HIM DIRECTLY WHETHER HE HAS REACHED A POINT OF NO RETURN IN HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT AND WHETHER HE IS STILL OPEN TO DIALOGUE WITH HIM; HIS ANSWER WAS EQUIVOCAL. IN RESPONSE TO HIS ASSERTION THAT HE IS "IN PERFECT CONTROL" OF THE OPPOSITION AND OF MASS EVENTS LIKE HIS NEXT PLANNED PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION ON SATURDAY AT AMBOHIJATOVA PARK, WE CAUTIONED THAT UNSEEN FORCES NEITHER ON HIS SIDE NOR THE PRESIDENT'S COULD EASILY TRY TO EXPLOIT THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN GAIN, INCLUDING EVEN BY TRYING TO KILL THE MAYOR AND PINNING BLAME FOR THE ACT ON THE GOVERNMENT; THAT TOO HAD NO VISIBLE IMPACT ON HIS Demeanor. IN PARTING,

WE ASSURED HIM THAT WE WOULD ALSO BE TALKING STRAIGHT WITH THE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT AND ENCOURAGING THEM TO LOOK FOR GESTURES AND ACTIONS THAT WOULD HELP RE-ESTABLISH DIALOGUE AND COMMUNICATION. WE SAID THAT WE WOULD EXPECT HIM TO WELCOME AND RESPOND POSITIVELY TO ANY SUCH ACTIONS, IF THEY COME. HE CLOSED BY REASSURING US OF HIS OPENNESS TO DIALOGUE AND HIS COMMITMENT TO NON-VIOLENT CHANGE. WE WERE, HOWEVER, NOT THE LEAST BIT REASSURED BY HIS OVERSALL PRESENTATION. FINALLY, TGV ASSURED US THAT "I AM NOT BEING MANIPULATED BY ANYONE; EVERYTHING I AM DOING IS ENTIRELY MY OWN IDEA AND OF MY OWN WILL."

4. (C) IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER WE MET (WITHOUT THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR) FOR TWO HOURS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, THE MEETING BEING THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO OUR URGENT REQUEST TO SEE THE PRESIDENT BEFORE SATURDAY'S DEMONSTRATION. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS LEAVING FRIDAY MORNING FOR A SADC SUMMIT IN SOUTH AFRICA AND DID NOT HAVE TIME TO RECEIVE US BEFORE THEN, BUT WOULD PROBABLY DO SO UPON HIS RETURN ON MONDAY. BOTH RETIRED GENERALS AND THUS VERY FAMILIAR WITH SECURITY ISSUES, THE TWO MINISTERS WRUNG THEIR HANDS ABOUT THE SECURITY DILEMMA THEY FACE ON SATURDAY: EITHER THEY RESPOND WITH FORCE AND RISK A CONFRONTATION, OR SIT BACK AND RISK ALLOWING DISORDER TO ESCALATE WHICH THEY WOULD THEN BE IN NO POSITION TO CONTROL. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT THEY HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHAT TO DO, AND HIMSELF RAISED THE SCENARIO IN WHICH THE MAYOR COULD BE ASSASSINATED BY A "THIRD COLUMN" AND THE BLAME STUCK ON THE GOVERNMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT "WE MALAGASY DO THIS IN A CYCLICAL FASHION, BUILDING UP OUR COUNTRY AND THEN DESTROYING EVERYTHING WE HAVE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH SUCH ACTIONS." THE TWO MINISTERS LAMENTED THE "HATE-SPEAK" NOW ON THE LOCAL AIRWAVES AND IN THE PRESS, EQUATING IT TO RWANDA IN 1994 AND MULLING OVER THEIR UNPLEASANT OPTIONS IN TERMS OF POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO IT. FOREIGN MINISTER RANJEVA ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DISPAIRED OF THEIR MANY FAILED EFFORTS -- INCLUDING THROUGH TGV'S MOTHER -- TO REACH OUT AND CREATE EFFECTIVE LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO HIM THAT WOULD CIRCUMVENT THE CIRCLE AROUND HIM. HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER BOTH SAID THEY HAVE INTELLIGENCE LINKING TGV'S ACTIONS TO EXILED FORMER PRESIDENT RATSIRAKA IN PARIS, AND THAT THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT TGV IS BEING ENTIRELY MANIPULATED AND IS THUS NOT A TRUSTWORTHY NEGOTIATING PARTNER AS THEY SEEK TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION. WHO CAN WE NEGOTIATE WITH, THEY ASKED RHETORICALLY?

5. (C) THE EU AMBASSADOR LAID OUT A NUMBER OF PRINCIPLES SHARED BY THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR DIALOGUE, THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING VIOLENCE, AND THE NEED FOR BOTH SIDES TO SHOW RESPECT FOR THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE ELECTED OFFICES ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE -- AND THE CONSEQUENCES FOR MADAGASCAR AND ITS DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS IF THE SITUATION CANNOT BE RIGHTED. WE EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR DEPLOYING MINIMUM FORCE TO CONTROL SATURDAY'S EVENT, NOTING THAT THIS APPROACH HAD WORKED WELL AT LAST SATURDAY'S NON-VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT "THE SITUATION THIS WEEKEND IS MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN LAST WEEKEND, AND I DO NOT KNOW IF WE CAN RISK TAKING THE SAME APPROACH." I ASKED WHETHER THE RE-OPENING OF THE CLOSED TV STATION MIGHT NOT BE AN APPROPRIATE GESTURE TO RE-ESTABLISH TRUST AND DIALOGUE, TO GIVE THE GOM BACK SOME OF THE MORAL HIGH GROUND, AND ALSO TO MOVE AWAY FROM RESTRICTIONS ON PRESS FREEDOM WHICH ARE PROBLEMATIC IN OTHER RESPECTS. THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED IN RESPONSE WHAT "GUARANTEE" WE COULD OFFER OF SUCCESS IF THEY DO THAT (NONE, OF COURSE). THE FOREIGN MINISTER POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS A LEGAL PROCEDURE BY WHICH THE MAYOR COULD REQUEST THE RE-OPENING OF THE TV STATION, AND THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO A LEGAL, FACE-SAVING DENOUEMENT; HOWEVER, HE NOTED THAT TGV HAS CHOSEN NOT TO PURSUE THIS AVENUE, AND OPINED THAT THIS IS PROOF THAT HE IS NOT SERIOUS. THE PRIME MINISTER SUMMARIZED: "THE PROBLEMS ARE ELSEWHERE, WE KNOW THAT THEY WANT A COUP D'ETAT. RE-OPENING THE STATION WILL SOLVE NOTHING, BUT WE ARE OPEN TO DOING IT IF IT WOULD HELP. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY WILL RESPOND IF WE EXTEND OUR HAND. IN FACT, THE PRESIDENT DID EXTEND HIS HAND AND SO FAR HAS GOTTEN NO REPLY." NONETHELESS, HE AGREED THAT TRYING TO ENGINEER SOME SORT OF PEACE-MAKING MEETING BETWEEN THE MAYOR AND PRESIDENT UPON THE LATTER'S RETURN HELD THE MOST PROMISE FOR CALMING THESE ROILED WATERS -- BUT ITSELF WOULD NOT BE EASY TO BRING ABOUT. RANJEVA ENDED THE DISCUSSION WITH A QUASI-PROMISE THAT WE WILL ALL MEET WITH THE PRESIDENT ON MONDAY NIGHT AFTER HIS RETURN. BOTH HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER PRAISED THIS DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE FROM "TRUE FRIENDS OF MADAGASCAR."

6. (C) I MET ON FRIDAY MORNING WITH THE FRENCH CHARGE TO BRIEF HER ON THESE MEETINGS (WHICH SHE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ATTEND DUE TO A SENIOR VISITING "FRANCOPHONIE" DELEGATION FROM THE ELYSEE). SHE SAID THAT SHE ALSO HAS PASSED IDENTICAL AND EQUALLY URGENT MESSAGES TO BOTH SIDES BUT HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE PROBLEM HAS BECOME THE "OUT-OF-CONTROL MAYOR". SHE HAS WARNED HIM THAT FRANCE ALSO WOULD HAVE TO SIDE WITH THE DULY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF MADAGASCAR IF ANY EXTRA-LEGAL ACTIONS ARE UNDERTAKEN TO UNSEAT HIM. SHE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE SAFETY OF THE LARGE FRENCH EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY IN MADAGASCAR AND CONFIRMED THAT THEY ARE ISSUING ANOTHER WARDEN MESSAGE TODAY (AS WE ARE) WARNING FRENCH CITIZENS OF "ESCALATING DANGER AND HIGH RISK" DOWNTOWN

ON SATURDAY AND PERHAPS BEYOND. SHE NOTED THAT THE ELYSEE HELD A CRISIS MEETING ON THIS SITUATION THURSDAY, BUT SAID THAT SHE DID NOT YET HAVE ANY READOUT ON ITS RESULTS. WE HAVE NO CHOICES, SHE SAID, BUT TO HUNKER DOWN AND KEEP A LOW PROFILE (READ: THE FRENCH COMMUNITY IS SO LARGE HERE THAT NO EVACUATION IS FEASIBLE). SHE GUESSED THAT THE GOM WOULD OPT FOR A LOWER-PROFILE SECURITY PRESENCE ON SATURDAY, WHICH SHE AGREED WOULD BE A GOOD THING. NOT SO GOOD, SHE SAID, WAS THE PRESIDENT'S DELIBERATE DECISION TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY TODAY (FOR A SUMMIT MEETING THAT DOES NOT START UNTIL MONDAY) AND THUS TO BE ABSENT FROM MADAGASCAR FOR TOMORROW'S DEMONSTRATION. HER ANALYSIS WAS THAT RAVALOMANANA WANTS TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM WHAT COULD POSSIBLY BECOME A VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION, OR EVEN A COUP ATTEMPT, AND THUS AVOID RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME FOR WHATEVER HAPPENS (WHILE ALSO ASSURING HIS OWN PHYSICAL SAFETY). COMPARING NOTES, IT WAS CLEAR THAT RAVALOMANANA HAD CONVENED A MEETING THIS MORNING BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE OF SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIALS -- AT WHICH HE UNDOUBTEDLY GAVE SOME INSTRUCTIONS.

7. (C) COMMENT: THERE IS NO LONGER MUCH QUESTION HERE THAT THE LONG-SIMMERING DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MAYOR AND PRESIDENT HAS NOW BECOME A FULL-BLOWN POLITICAL CRISIS, EVEN AS -- IN PECULIAR MALAGASY STYLE -- NO SHOT HAS BEEN FIRED OR ANY PERSON INJURED OR JAILED (YET). WITH REGIME CHANGE NOW THE MAYOR'S STATED GOAL, THE GOM WILL BE TEMPTED TO TREAT THIS AS NOTHING LESS THAN AN ILLEGAL COUP ATTEMPT, AND NO DOUBT IS MULLING OVER A RANGE OF RESPONSES INCLUDING SOME HIGHLY FORCEFUL ONES. ALL EYES ARE NOW ON SATURDAY'S DEMONSTRATION: IF IT MANAGES TO PASS PEACEFULLY AND/OR FAILS TO DRAW A SUFFICIENTLY IMPRESSIVE CROWD, TENSIONS MAY START TO FALL AS WEARY MALAGASY RETURN TO THEIR DAILY LIVES AND/OR TGV STARTS TO REALIZE THAT HIS SUPPORT IS WEAKER THAN HE THOUGHT. HOWEVER, WE AND OTHERS REMAIN QUITE NERVOUS ABOUT THE ALTERNATIVE -- A VIOLENT SPARK THAT COULD THEN START BURNING OUT OF CONTROL.

MARQUARDT

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President May Be Open To Meeting -- But Not To Real Dialogue

Origin Embassy Antananarivo (Madagascar)

Cable time Fri, 30 Jan 2009 08:18UTC

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

O 300818Z JAN 09

FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2021

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DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP PRIORITY

NSC WASHDC PRIORITY SECDEF WASHDC

PRIORITY USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000069

E.O. 12958:

DECL: 01/30/2019

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MAY BE OPEN TO MEETING -- BUT NOT TO REAL DIALOGUE
REF: ANTAN 68 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: **Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.4b and d.**

1. (C) Summary: President Ravalomanana told ambassadors Thursday that he is open to meeting the Mayor, but not to any broad dialogue with him, or anyone else. A meeting may or may not occur Friday at 1500 at the German residence. Prospects for the meeting have dimmed as the Mayor publicly stated that the meeting would be to discuss a transition government, after the President had insisted on meeting without conditions. The situation is therefore not yet ripe here for any message from Washington to the President. End summary.

2. (C) The chiefs of mission from US, France, Germany, EU, and the UN system met President Ravalomanana Thursday at 1700 for about 30 minutes. Our intent was to stress the dire situation now prevailing in Madagascar and to push the President to accept the need for a wide-ranging dialogue, initially with the Mayor but eventually with a broader spectrum of political actors, about the future of the country and its governance. In the event, we took turns raising the same issues and each time the President cut us off crisply but politely with reassurances that there is no need to change the government, to change any ministers, to hold any conferences, or to include other actors in the dialogue. He agreed in principle to meet the Mayor alone, saying "we can take this little by little." He complained of the Mayor's duplicitous nature and therefore of the difficulty in negotiating with him. He stressed confidence-building measures he has already approved, like restoring Viva radio and TV and a public denial of the "ridiculous rumor" of the presence in Madagascar of foreign mercenaries. He confirmed his commitment to avoiding

further bloodshed and said that the restraint of the military earlier this week had been intentional. The President mentioned the change in leadership of the National Gendarmerie approved that day, saying that it will help to have a Cotier in charge as they deal with problems on the coasts. He also listed various political actors from both the coast and the plateau "with whom I will deal with separately and individually". He named the price that each of these actors would require in exchange for acquiescence to Ravalomanana's continuing rule: some want money, others want a place in the government, others (Zafy) want coastal interest to be emphasized. He said he would not deal with the ex-Arema leadership at all, including Roland Ratsiraka. He also requested our help in rebuilding his country after this week's destruction.

3. (C) I relayed the President's openness to a meeting to the Mayor afterward. He readily accepted and proposed 1500 Friday. By Friday morning the word back from the Presidency on that proposal was that the President was extremely annoyed that the Mayor had said publicly by radio that he would be meeting the President "to discuss a transition government," and that he was only willing to meet without pre-conditions. Foreign Minister Ranjeva came to see me mid-morning on Friday to discuss ways to get the President back on track for the meeting this afternoon. He agreed that the status quo ante is not possible and asked us to keep pushing the President to accept the meeting and, over time, to agree to make concessions. He left to see the Prime Minister to discuss the situation, and then hoped to see the President directly to encourage him to keep the 1500 appointment. I and the German Ambassador have a 1200 appointment with the Mayor to encourage him to tone down his public rhetoric and to prepare him for a first encounter with the President that clearly will fall short of his expectations. Our objective is to dissuade him from any inflammatory statements after the meeting, including at tomorrow's demonstration on the Place du 13 Mai.

4. (C) Comment: Notwithstanding assurances from both sides of their willingness to meet, this week's several failed meetings highlight the difficulty of actually bringing the two parties together. Culturally, it is important for Malagasy leaders to appear open to dialogue, and indeed the public is hanging here on this meeting taking place, if only as a modest first step toward eventual real dialogue. The President probably perceives the balance of power shifting in his favor, as he has restored order, notes the fractious nature of the Mayor's coalition and his difficulties in holding it together, sees the public getting tired of confrontation, perhaps thinks the Mayor's popularity is falling (evidenced by yesterday's failed "ville morte," and reinforced if a smaller crowd show up tomorrow), and -- given his statements to us about the "price" of various opposition camps -- intends to do whatever it takes to peel them off one by one. As such, the President probably sees time as being on his side and is in no hurry to accept negotiations or offer concessions. The quixotic Mayor's calculations are harder to perceive, but if he also senses his coalition weakening or his popularity falling, he might be more inclined to double-down with more extreme statements that worsen the situation. Concerning the President, it is clear from conversations with Ranjeva and others that he remains overly confident, unpredictable, isolated, and is not listening to much advice from anyone (nor is anyone inclined to give him any hard messages). For now, we recommend keeping a line open

to Paris on their plans and perceptions. It is clearly premature to make any call to Ravalomanana now or soon, as he is in not open to hearing any hard messages at this time. End comment.

MARQUARDT

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Madagascar: Abandoning Ravalomanana

Origin Embassy Antananarivo (Madagascar)

Cable time Mon, 9 Feb 2009 08:44 UTC

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NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

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USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000090

E.O. 12958:

DECL: 02/09/2019

SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: ABANDONING RAVALOMANANA

Classified By: **AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.**

1. (C) KEY CONTACTS ARE TELLING THE AMBASSADOR THAT SUPPORT FOR RAVALOMANANA FROM WITHIN THE MILITARY AND HIS OWN GOVERNMENT IS WEAKENING. KEY MINISTERS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO RESIGN THIS MORNING, WHILE THE MILITARY IS LIKELY TO REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES AND LET THE POLITICS PLAY OUT.

2. (C) NAVY CHIEF ADMIRAL ABEL RADAVIDSON CAME BY MY RESIDENCE ON SUNDAY MORNING FOR COFFEE. HAVING CALLED ME ON SATURDAY EVENING RIGHT AFTER THE BLOODBATH, HE REITERATED HIS DEEP CONCERN THAT EVENTS WERE OUT OF CONTROL AND THAT THE PRESIDENT, IN PARTICULAR, "NEEDS TO BE REIGNED IN. HE NEEDS TO CEDE POWER." ON SUNDAY, HE CONVINCINGLY REAFFIRMED THE MILITARY'S DEVOTION TO RESPECTING THE CONSTITUTION WHILE WORKING HARD TO MAINTAIN AND RESTORE ORDER. HE SAID THAT GENERAL LUCIEN, THE RECENTLY APPOINTED ARMY CHIEF, WAS COMMITTED TO "STAYING WITHIN THE CONSTITUTION" AND HAD GREAT OVERSEAS TRAINING ON THE PROPER LINES BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THEIR CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP. THAT SAID, THEY HAD ALL LOST RESPECT FOR RAVALOMANANA AND HIS IDIOSYNCRASIES AND STRANGE DECISIONS. HE CITED THE RECENT PURCHASE OF A DOLS 60 MILLION PRESIDENTIAL AIRCRAFT, RATHER THEN USING THE MONEY FOR GREATER NATIONAL PRIORITIES; RADAVIDSON SAID HE COULD HAVE BOUGHT AN ENTIRE COAST GUARD FOR THAT PRICE. THE BLOODBATH ON SATURDAY "CROSSED A LINE" FOR MOST MALAGASY AND HE DOUBTED THE PRESIDENT COULD SURVIVE NOW. HE SAID THAT HE IS CONVINCED, AS ARE OTHER SENIOR MILITARY, THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD WHO FIRED ON THE UNARMED CIVILIANS INCLUDED RECENTLY-ADDED FOREIGN SOLDIERS. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HE HAD IDENTIFIED SOME OF THEM -- SOUTH AFRICANS -- WHEN HE RECENTLY FLEW BACK VIA JOHANNESBURG FROM THE IMO CONFERENCE IN DJIBOUTI. THE DOUBLE INSULT TO THE MILIARY -- ADDING FOREIGNERS TO THE GUARD AND ALLOWING THEM TO KILL UNARMED MALAGASY -- WAS DEEPLY RESENTED WITHIN THE MILITARY, WHO ARE NOW TARNISHED WITH THIS IGNOMINIOUS ACT EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE NOT PART OF THE VIOLENT RESPONSE. THE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE DEFENSE MINISTER TO BE RESIGNING (WHICH BECAME PUBLIC THIS MORNING).

3. (C) ON MONDAY MORNING ENVIRONMENT MINISTER HARISON RANDRIAMANANA CALLED ME IN A DEEP STATE OF DESPAIR, A CLOSE PRESIDENTIAL INSIDER (INDEED, HE WAS ONE OF THE THREE WHO ENGAGED IN SECRET NEGOTIATIONS ON THURSDAY AND FRIDAY ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT), HE SAID HE WAS BEDRIDDEN WITH HYPERTENSION, UNDER DOCTOR'S ORDERS, HIDING IN A FRIEND'S HOUSE, AND READY TO COLLAPSE. HE FORETOLD COMING RESIGNATIONS AND OPENLY DEBATED WHETHER HE TOO SHOULD FOLLOW SUIT. HE WAS RELUCTANT TO RESIGN, HE SAID, ONLY BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE MOMENTUM TO THE MAYOR'S TEAM, WITH WHOM HE WAS FURIOUS AND DISGUSTED. "THEY LIED TO US ON FRIDAY: THEY PROMISED THEY WOULD MAKE THEIR ANNOUNCEMENTS BUT NOT ADVANCE ON THE PALACE. THEN THEY DID., IT WAS INTENTIONAL." HE DEBATED ALOUD WHETHER THERE WAS ANYTHING THE PRESIDENT CAN STILL DO TO HOLD POWER: DISSOLVE THE GOVERNMENT, APPOINT A POWERFUL COTIER PRIME MINISTER, CANCEL THE AU SUMMIT, ETC? HE OBSERVED THAT "RAVALOMANANA IS LISTENING TO NO ONE." HE CONFIRMED THE ARREST WARRANT FOR THE MAYOR

AND OPINED THAT IT WOULD JUST ENVENIMATE THE SITUATION FURTHER (A POINT RADAVIDSON ALSO MADE).

4. (C) A DESPONDANT ECONOMICS MINISTER IVOHASINA RAZAFIMAHEFA ALSO CAME BY ON SATURDAY TO DISCUSS HIS CONCERNS. HE ALSO SAID HE WAS READY TO RESIGN, IF THAT WOULD HELP MATTERS, BUT HE WAS NOT DECIDED. HE SAID THAT ALL MINISTERS ARE LIVING IN FEAR, AFRAID FOR THEIR AND THEIR FAMILIES' LIVES, AND DO NOT FEEL SUPPORTED BY THE PRESIDENT, WHO REMAINS LARGELY ISOLATED. HE WANTED TO UNDERSTAND STATEMENTS I AND THE EUROPEAN UNION HAD MADE ON FRIDAY, IN WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED SOME OF THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF THE MALAGASY PEOPLE AND IN WHICH THE EU DISCLOSED PUBLICLY FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT CERTAIN ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS HAD BEEN SUSPENDED BY THOSE PROVIDING DIRECT BUDGET SUPPORT, OUT OF CONCERN FOR GOVERNANCE ISSUES. HE LEFT UNDERSTANDING THAT, FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, IT WAS NO LONGER "BUSINESS AS USUAL" IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE GOM. HE SAID IT WAS UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER THAT MESSAGE WAS REACHING THE PRESIDENT.

MARQUARDT

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ONLY AMERICAN INTERESTS (madagate.com view)

Eac Convened To Discuss Malagasy Security Forces Firing On Opposition Protesters At The Presidential Palace

Origin Embassy Antananarivo (Madagascar)

Cable time Mon, 9 Feb 2009 09:43 UTC

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

P 090943Z FEB 09

FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2056

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000092

DEPT FOR DS, D, P, M, S/CT, CA, AND INR

DEPT FOR DS/AF/IP DEPT FOR DS/ITA/AF

DEPT FOR AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2027

**SUBJECT: EAC CONVENED TO DISCUSS MALAGASY SECURITY FORCES FIRING ON
OPPOSITION PROTESTERS AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE**

REF: STATE 103991

1. (SBU) An Emergency Action Committee (EAC) Meeting, chaired by DCM Stromayer, was convened at the DCR, also the Alternate Command Center (ACC), on Sunday, February 8 to discuss the impact of Saturday's massacre at the Presidential Palace. In light of these events, the EAC met to review trip wires and discuss the current situation and the potential impact on the community.

2. (C)The EAC reviewed yesterday's event and shared information. On Saturday, February 7, at

approximately 1444 local time, the Malagasy Presidential Guard opened fire on opposition protesters, a crowd estimated between 10,000-20,000, marching towards the palace. (Note: This downtown palace is little used by the Malagasy President and was unoccupied except by security forces.) This was especially disconcerting as the palace is located within a few blocks of the U.S. Embassy. At present, 50 are reported dead, 172 wounded and 100 hospitalized. Sunday was declared a day of mourning and another day of mourning, along with a viewing of the bodies of the fallen, will take place at Place 13 Mai on Monday at 10:00 am. It was noted that the French Embassy declared it would be closed on Monday given its proximity to scheduled gathering at Place 13 Mai. In addition, the French School decided to release their students four days early for their winter break. The EAC decided that it would be prudent to close the U.S. Embassy on Monday as well as it is also located near Monday's planned event. Both USAID and MCC will remain open as they are located at alternate locations, far from downtown.

3. (C) The Management Section expressed concerns about the continued disruption of flights to and from Madagascar. Air France has consolidated some of their flights claiming that they are undersold. On Sunday, a flight from South Africa Airways was denied air space and thus landing, possibly due to an issue with the manifest. This is the second South African Air fight turned around in flight this week. In addition, a flight from Reunion was canceled. Even more disconcerting was Management's expressed concern that from day to day, they are have difficulty obtaining flight schedules, accurate information and notice of cancellations. They are continually chasing rumors of cancellations which is compounded by the fact that local Air France and Air Madagascar offices are frequently out of contact. Management admitted that they have no clear understanding of the recent flight patterns. The Ambassador instructed them to contact the DG's from the four major airline companies on Monday for a better appreciation of their scheduling.

4. (C) The GSO informed the committee that the previous night, on the return from an airport run, the embassy armored vehicle was hit by stones thrown at it. The area where the incident occurred is less than two miles from the embassy residential area. It is unclear as to whether the vehicle was targeted because of its CD status or was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. RSO noted no significant damage to the vehicle.

5. (C) The Director of the Peace Corps (PC) noted that PC headquarters is considering evacuation of all Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs) from the island if circumstances do not improve. Currently, the 124 PCVs are consolidated at 13 different points and they are in the process of continuing to reduce the points by four. RSO noted that the UN was contemplating moving to "Phase III" in light of the Saturday's events. Many private and non-profit companies have provided R&Rs for non-essential staff and family members to either Mauritius or to the U.S., but have not chosen to evacuate per se.

(C) 6. (C) The DCM reviewed the tripwires and discussed the community's thoughts on authorized departure. Although it was noted that we are indeed crossing tripwires for authorized departure, it is unclear if the members of the American Embassy community want to depart at this time. In order to gather a true sense of the community's thoughts regarding possible departure, the DCM called for an official community town hall meeting Monday at the DCR. In addition, he sent an e-mail to all community members specifically asking for confirmation of who would be interested in leaving if we moved to an authorized departure at this time.

7. (C) RSO will send a separate e-mail to DS/IP/AF with all logistical and other requested information.

MARQUARDT

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Engaging With The New Malagasy "government"

Origin Embassy Antananarivo (Madagascar)

Cable time Wed, 18 Mar 2009 13:14 UTC

Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VZCZCXYZ0009 RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAN #0187/01 0771314

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

R 181314Z MAR 09

FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2214

INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE

RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0140

RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

UNCLAS ANTANANARIVO 000187

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV

ADDIS ABABA FOR DYAMAMOTO

PRETORIA FOR RBROWN, HLALIME

PARIS FOR RKANEDA

LONDON FOR PLORD

BRUSSELS FOR DFRANCIS

USUN FOR RDICARLO, AWOLFF

E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: Engaging with the new Malagasy "Government"

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Post seeks guidance from the department on an expected request for contact with the transition government of Andry Rajoelina (see paragraph 3). The transfer of power from the short-lived military directorate to another unnamed entity with Rajoelina as its president occurred Tuesday, and today Madagascar's High Constitutional Court (HCC) has ruled - outrageously but expectedly -- that it is constitutional. The Ambassador (among other diplomats) expects to be convoked very soon by the new government and requests Department

guidance on this expected situation. In terms of how to respond to what was clearly an unconstitutional transfer of power, splits are already visible in the positions likely to be taken by the French, AU, UN, EU, Francophonie, and bilateral partners, which suggest a need for urgent coordination with other capitals/organizations. Informal translations of the founding documents of the new government are included in paras 6-8.

END SUMMARY.

2. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests urgent department guidance on how the Ambassador (or DCM) should respond to an expected, formal convocation from "President" Rajoelina, or members of his yet-to-be-named government. Note that media will almost certainly be present and that participation would confer, in public opinion, some sense of legitimacy on the new administration. On the other hand, failure to appear would almost certainly bring further condemnation on the United States and potentially endanger personnel and private citizens here by the supporters of the new regime who have little tolerance for international norms or comprehension of international law. Given the above, our recommendation is to appear, listen to what the Malagasy interlocutors have to say, take note initially with minimal comment, and make no public remarks for the time being.

3. (SBU) Divisions within local diplomatic corps. In light of yesterday's events and this morning's HCC ruling, it is likely that the Rajoelina's "High Transitional Authority" HTA Government soon will convoke members of the diplomatic corps in Antananarivo, individually or together. Ambassador Marquardt has already received a phone call from HTA "Minister of Finance" Benja Razafimahaleo expressing his desire to work with the United States and other international donors, to which he responded noncommittally. In a meeting among the diplomatic corps this morning, the French clearly signaled a willingness to hold their noses, praise the Malagasy for (so far) the absence of further violence during the ongoing transfer of power, and move on; the arrival this afternoon of new ambassador Jean-Marc Chataigner portends a felicitous French position vis-a-vis TGV, in most observers' eyes. The EU expressed a strong preference in favor of re-establishing constitutionality, respecting human rights, good governance, etc. - but admitted that their position would depend on coordination among member states (in which France will no doubt play a lead role). Ambassador Marquardt said that Washington is still reviewing the situation and that the USG would not get out in front of the process, but expressed the view that after two months of evoking the consequences of an unlawful solution, the international community cannot fail to react to the obviously unconstitutional outcome. Several COMs expressed their unconditional willingness to respond if Rajoelina calls them, but others remain hesitant given the tenuous legal situation, notwithstanding the HCC's endorsement, which was not unexpected. All ambassadors agreed on one thing: further statements or reactions should come from capitals and headquarters, not from embassies here, and they should not be rushed in the current tense climate.

4. (SBU) The AU (Special Envoy Ouedraogo) seems very flexible, as well as the Francophonie (Kodjo); their concerns seemed more aimed at having the right impact in Madagascar than in upholding principles; the Francophonie's position was closer to France's, and the AU seemed more concerned about practicalities than principles. Among the envoys, only the UN (Drame) expressed a strong position in support of consequences, and accompanying statements and talking points, for the extra-constitutional solution now in progress. In formulating a USG response to recent events, we recommend looking first to the African Union and the United Nations for their reactions. We also continue to believe that any formal declarations concerning the status of this new government and our reaction to the means by which it came to power should come from Washington, in prior coordination with the AU, UN, EU, Paris, and South Africa, as appropriate. As noted above, France is unlikely to be in favor of anything but a pragmatic response, given their significant presence here; indeed, TGV praised their position today - on no one else's -- on the public square - in part due to their having taken him in last week (with cover from the rest of us).

5. (SBU) Founding documents of the HTA government: as background, summary translations of the three key documents that have led to the formation of the new government follow. These documents include: A. the ordinance transferring power from former President Ravalomanana to a military directorate; B. the ordinance transferring power from the military directorate to Andry Rajoelina; and C. a letter from Rajoelina to the High Constitutional Court (HCC) requesting a judgment on the "validity" of these documents and the legalization of Rajoelina's control. Around noon, March 18 the HCC unsurprisingly announced its decision on this request by giving Rajoelina full authority at the head of the High Transitional Authority.

6. (U) Following is a summary translation of Ordinance 2009-01, in which then-President Ravalomanana transferred power to the Military Directorate.

Begin translated text

Republic of Madagascar Presidency of the Republic

The President

Ordinance 2009-001 of March 17, 2009

Conferring full powers to a Military Directorate

The President of the Republic

Noting that the prevailing circumstances require the safeguarding of the higher interests of the nation;

Considering that the principle of continuity of the state constitutes a general legal principle with constitutional value;

Given the constitution, notably article 44 paragraph 1, which contains:

"The President of the Republic guarantees the respect of the Constitution. He is the guarantor of the indivisibility of the Republic. He is the guarantor, by his arbitrage, of the regular functioning of public powers, of national independence, and of territorial integrity. He guarantees the protection and respect of national sovereignty, both internally and externally. He is the guarantor of National Unity."

Orders:

Article 1: Full powers are given to a Military Directorate, headed by the oldest member of the highest rank of all armed forces. He is the President.

Article 2: The composition and organization of this Military Directorate are left to the President's discretion.

Article 3: The Military Directorate exercises cumulatively the functions of President of the Republic and those of the Prime Minister, which are granted to them by the Constitution. Article 4: The Military Directorate has the following mission: Organize a national conference in order to discuss and elaborate eventual modifications to the Constitution; Prepare revisions to the Electoral Code; Prepare the law on political parties; Organize elections in at least twenty four months; The Military Directorate can take all other measures that it deems necessary in order to restore public order, and ensure an authentic national reconciliation permitting true economic and social development.

Article 5: For reasons of urgency, and conforming to the dispositions of article 4 of ordinance 62-041 from September 19, 1962 concerning the general dispositions of internal law and private international law, the current ordinance enters into effect immediately as soon as it has been posted or published by radio or television, independent from its publication in the official journal. It will be executed as law of the government.

Antananarivo, March 17, 2009

Marc RAVALOMANANA [Signature]

End translated text

7. (U) Following is a summary translation of Ordinance 2009-02, from the Military Directorate, transferring power to Andry Rajoelina.

Begin translated text

The President of the Military Directorate

Given the constitution,

Given Ordinance 2009-001 of March 17, 2009 conferring full power to a Military Directorate, Orders:

Article 1: Full powers are given to Mr. Andry Rajoelina to manage the country, in place of the Military Directorate install by ordinance 2009-001 of March 17, 2009.

Article 2: He exercises the functions and attributions of President of the Republic, conforming to the dispositions of the constitution for a maximum period of 24 months.

Article 3: Mr. Andry Rajoelina has as his mission the organization of a transition regime towards a Fourth Republic, and to take all measures necessary to this end.

Article 4: For reasons of urgency, and conforming to the dispositions of article 4 of ordinance 62-041 from September 19, 1962 concerning the general dispositions of internal law and private international law, the current ordinance enters into effect immediately as soon as it has been posted or published by radio or television, independent from its publication in an official journal.

It will be executed as law of the government.

Antananarivo, March 17, 2009

Vice Admiral Hyppolite RARISON RAMAROSON, President [Signature]

Major General Ranto RABARISOA, Member [Signature]

Major General Rivo RAZAFINDRALAMBO, Member [Signature]

End translated text

8. (U) Following is a summary translation of Rajoelina's request for a judgement on the validity of this ordinance, and of Ordinance 2009-01, in which then-President Ravalomanana transferred power to the Military Directorate.

Begin translated text:

President Andry Rajoelina Villa 26, Residence of Ambatobe

TO

The President, Ladies and Gentlemen of the High Constitutional Court

Ambohidahy

Antananarivo, March 17, 2009

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen High Councilors,

I have the honor to send you two ordinances:

Ordinance 2009-001 from March 17, 2009 conferring full power to a Military Directorate.
Ordinance 2009-002 from March 17, 2009 transferring full powers to Mr. Andry Rajoelina

I would appreciate your certification of the validity of these two ordinances and to take appropriate action.

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen High Councilors, please accept assurances of my highest consideration.

President Andry Nirina Rajoelina [Signature]

End translated text

MARQUARDT

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Madagascar/ravalomanana: I Did Not Resign!

Origin Embassy Antananarivo (Madagascar)

Cable time Fri, 20 Mar 2009 09:29 UTC

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

O 200929Z MAR 09

FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2226 INFO
AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY

CJTF HOA PRIORITY CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000195 E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019

SUBJECT: **MADAGASCAR/RAVALOMANANA: I DID NOT RESIGN!**

Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FO REASONS 1.4 D AND E.

1. (C) A breathless ex-President Ravalomanana phoned the ambassador today from his

undisclosed location (believed to be somewhere near Antsirabe) to explain a few things. Referring to their last two dramatic meetings on Tuesday morning (when he showed the US and South African ambassadors and UN Mediator Drame his signed ordinance transferring power to a military directorate, before taking flight), he stated that he had not resigned. "I was forced to sign this by the military who came to my office and threatened me 15 minutes before you came in, The 'military directorate' idea was a way not to do what they wanted," he said. "Then I barely got out before they came back after you left." He pointed out (correctly) that the word "resignation" is nowhere to be found in that document. He implored the USG to follow SADC in not recognizing TGV, to whom he had been unwilling to transfer power directly on Tuesday, he added. "This is a coup." He indicated that he is in touch "with SADC" to get himself (and presumably his wife and one remaining son) out of the country as he feels very threatened. He did not request USG assistance in getting him out, and the ambassador did not offer any.

(2) The ambassador expressed hope that he will get out of Madagascar unharmed and supported his decision to leave. He told Ravalomanana that the USG yesterday had called the change of power "undemocratic" and will have more to say after further review. He explained to Ravalomanana that whatever the USG says, it will be consistent with our laws, values, and principles -- and is not meant to express a partisan view or support for one side or the other in this continuing conflict.

3. (C) Ambassador's Comment: Ravalomanana clearly is still all over the map on what he wants to do next: stay, flee, engage in politics, withdraw, etc. He sent an intermediary, political dinosaur Manadafy Rakotonirina, to see me this morning (septel); Manadafy spoke of Ravalomanana's desire to launch a "comeback" and foreshadowed his latest position that, in fact, he did not resign. I have no knowledge of any ongoing SADC effort to rescue Ravalomanana but will continue to check around. One very unfortunate thing is that Ravalomanana continues to exhibit a high degree of cluelessness and disdain for what's best for Madagascar. He also continues (as most Malagasy do, unfortunately,) to interpret everything foreigners say or do in an entirely inaccurate, partisan way, looking for support for themselves from a position in support of democratic principles. He will not change, and I won't be surprised when he takes our decision on suspending non-humanitarian aid, when announced, as "evidence" of continuing USG support for him personally. Even more unfortunately, the new regime, and many in the Malagasy public (with the regime's encouragement), will also see it that way.

MARQUARDT

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Pressing For Early Elections In Madagascar

Origin Secretary of State (United States)

Cable time Thu, 26 Mar 2009 23:53 UTC

Classification UNCLASSIFIED

INFO LOG-00 AID-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 PDI-00 DS-00 UTED-00 VCI-00 H-00
TEDE-00 INR-00 MOFM-00 MOF-00 VCIE-00 NSAE-00 ISN-00 GIWI-00 P-00 ISNE-00 SP-00
IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 T-00 NCTC-00 FMP-00 BBG-00 IIP-00 SCRS-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00
SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-00 /000R O 262353Z MAR 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE INFO

XMT AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO

UNCLAS STATE 029453 E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: PRESSING FOR EARLY ELECTIONS IN MADAGASCAR

1. This is an action request. Please see paragraph 2.
2. ACTION REQUEST: Department requests embassies in South African Development

Community (SADC) member states to demarche host governments at the highest appropriate level prior to the upcoming SADC meeting in Swaziland to discuss Zimbabwe and Madagascar on March 30. Please deliver the following points: -- Express appreciation for SADC,s strong stance in regard to the unconstitutional change of power in Madagascar. -- Express the U.S. Government's deep concern about the undemocratic process through which President Marc Ravalomanana was forced to resign and Andry Rajoelina was subsequently installed as the de facto head of state in Madagascar. -- Emphasize that the U.S. considers this series of events tantamount to a coup d,etat and as a result is suspending all non-humanitarian aid to Madagascar. -- Ask that SADC urge Madagascar to take immediate steps to restore constitutional governance through peaceful means. -- Urge SADC member states to issue a strong communique that calls for presidential and legislative elections as soon as possible, preferably within six months. -- Request host government commitment to reinforce these points in any interactions they may have with Andry Rajoelina. -- Share our hope the people of Madagascar will take the steps necessary to return to democratic legitimacy and be able to continue its important development activities with international community participation.

----- BACKGROUND -----

3. (SBU) After two months of opposition protests, failed negotiations, and mutiny by the military, democratically-elected President Ravalomanana was forced to resign from office March 17, when he issued a decree under duress that unconstitutionally passed his powers to Madagascar's highest-ranking military officers. These officers were in turn forced by mutinous lower-ranking military officers to transfer power to former Mayor Andry Rajoelina via another unconstitutional decree.

4. (SBU) Rajoelina has declared himself &President of the High Transition Authority,8 named a cabinet, disbanded the National Assembly and the Senate, and pledged to hold presidential elections within 24 months, following a constitutional referendum and revision of the electoral code. France has publicly declared that 24 months is an unacceptably long timeframe. The African Union has called for elections within six months, suspended Madagascar, and warned the African Union may impose sanctions if constitutional order is not quickly restored. On March 20, the Department issued a statement condemning the undemocratic transfer of power, announcing that we are moving to suspend all non-humanitarian assistance, and calling for speedy new elections. SADC has condemned the coup, has not recognized Rajoelina,s government, and will discuss possible sanctions against Madagascar at the March 30 meeting. South Africa has publicly stated that it will support sanctions agreed to by SADC.

----- REPORTING DEADLINE -----

5. (U) Department greatly appreciates assistance and engagement from posts on this issue. Please report results of this effort via front-channel cable to AF/E, no later than OOB EDT Monday, March 30.

----- POINT OF CONTACT -----

6. (U) Please contact AF/E Maria Beyzerov at (202) 647-6453 or via email for any additional information required to meet our objectives.

CLINTON

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Malagasy Ambassador Makes Pitch For Reinstatement Of Ravalomanana

Origin Secretary of State (United States)

Cable time Mon, 4 May 2009 16:08 UTC

Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VZCZCXYZ0008 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHC #5029 1241627 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 041608Z
MAY 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 9037

INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 7343

UNCLAS STATE 045029 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A

SUBJECT: MALAGASY AMBASSADOR MAKES PITCH FOR REINSTATEMENT OF RAVALOMANANA

1. Summary: Dr. Denis Andriamandroso Madagascar's Ambassador to South Africa met with Acting A/S Carter to make the case for reinstatement of former President Marc Ravalomanana. The Ambassador acknowledged that Ravalomanana had made mistakes in his handling of the demonstrations leading to his ouster and would be willing to hold new elections in the near term. He warned against danger of a solution imposed by the international community. Acting A/S Carter made clear that the United States does not believe reinstatement is feasible or desirable and that the best way to restore constitutional rule is for Ravalomanana and other interested parties, to engage in the UN-led process with a view to holding elections before the end of 2009. End Summary.

2. On April 29, Acting A/S Philip Carter met with Dr. Denis Andriamandroso Madagascar's Ambassador to South Africa and Jocelyn Radifera, Ambassador to the United States, at their request. Ambassador Andriamandroso had been sent to the United States by former President Ravalomanana to advocate on behalf of reinstatement. The Ambassador embarked on a lengthy discourse outlining the former president's economic development achievements and the imperative of respect for the constitution. He acknowledged that the former president had made mistakes in how he handled the voices of dissatisfaction and demonstrations in the months leading to his ouster. The bottom line was that Ambassador Andriamandroso was arguing for the United States to support reinstatement of Ravalomanana who would then be willing to have elections in near term. He said the resignation was an act taken in emergency circumstances and should not be seen as irreversible. He said it was wrong to put Rajoelina and Ravalomanana on equal footing in looking at the way forward as that would undermine respect for the constitution and simply empower those who may wish to destabilize the country in the future. He also emphasized the importance of listening to the people currently demonstrating and risking their lives in support of Ravalomanana and warned against danger of a solution imposed by the international community.

3. Acting A/S Carter made it clear that we do not see Rajoelina as a legitimate leader but also said reinstatement of Ravalomanana is a non-starter. He said we need to look beyond that to a

process of reconciliation and free and fair elections. He outlined the USG position: -- Ravalomanana and TIM need to join the dialogue taking place under the auspices of the UN; -- the UN is natural focal point since it was there before during and after Ravalomanana resigned; -- the goal of the process should be organization of elections under auspices of an independent entity, probably the UN; -- we do not support changing the constitution before elections; a legitimate government needs to be in place before it is reviewed; -- no former president or Rajoelina should have any role in overseeing the election; the question of who will be able to contest it is a separate decision for the Malagasy to make (although given our view that existing constitution should be basis of election, Rajoelina would be ruled out); -- elections need not necessarily begin with presidential elections; the country could conceivably start with parliamentary or other elections as a first step to new presidential elections. **CLINTON**

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South African Charge Discusses Mediation Effort And Concern Re Ravalomanana And Mercenaries

Origin Embassy Antananarivo

(
Madagascar
)

Cable time Mon, 8 Jun 2009 15:47 UTC

P 081547Z JUN 09

FM AM EMBASSY ANTANANARIVO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

2511 INFO SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000414 STATE PLEASE PASS TO AF/E M
BEYZEROV

E.O. 12958:

DECL: 06/08/2014

**SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICAN CHARGE DISCUSSES MEDIATION EFFORT AND CONCERN
RE RAVALOMANANA AND MERCENARIES**

Classified By: DCM ERIC STROMAYER FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E

1. (C) Summary: Ambassador, DCM and DATT met June 8 with South African Charge Marius Conradie to discuss current state of mediation efforts and continuing rumors about possible recruitment of mercenaries by Marc Ravalomanana in South Africa or Swaziland to support his effort to return to power here in Madagascar. Conradie expressed concern about continuing rumors and the seriousness with which his government would treat any evidence of an effort by Ravalomanana to use South Africa as a staging area or recruitment base for mercenaries. This would be "unacceptable." He also mentioned that President Zuma and the Swazi King plan to meet June 9 in Capetown to discuss Madagascar. While expressing doubts about the likely outcome of the ongoing mediation in Madagascar which "seems to be going in circles," Conradie said that it may be time for the SAG to pressure Ravalomanana to tone down his rhetoric and unsubstantiated claims of South African support, or risk no longer being welcome in SA. End Summary South Africa and Ravalomanana

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2. (C) During the meeting Conradie mentioned Ravalomanana's problematic presence in South Africa. Early on he had requested SAG provision of a Radio transmitter to broadcast to Madagascar. The SAG refused to provide it. He also noted recent public claims by Ravalomanana that he had the support of President Zuma to return to Madagascar as President. Conradie said that President Zuma had only called for the restoration of a

constitutional order. In Conradie's view the continued inflammatory rhetoric from Ravalomanana was not in anyone's interest and he said he felt that given continuing rumors of efforts to recruit mercenaries in or around South Africa, his government would take a hard line with Ravalomanana, on this in particular. He further noted that the ex-president's passport expires soon so there is some discussion in SADC as to who might be able to provide him with some sort of provisional travel papers or residence status. South Africa does not want to do so. Mediation not very promising

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3. (C) Noting that the mediation had not progressed much since May 22, Conradie expressed particular concern regarding the current apparent agreement terms that would permit HAT leader Rajoelina to run the transitional government and run for president simultaneously (a possibility the US has flagged as inherently flawed to the mediators and contact group on several occasions). Further, it appears that none of the mediators are talking to Ravalomanana. In fact, Conradie had just heard that though tasked with doing so, the SADC team leader Themba Absalom Dlamini had not in fact met with Ravalomanana on his return to Swaziland ten days ago. Conradie believes it may be time for the SAG to weigh in with Ravalomanana to try and move the mediation forward. The longer the deadlock in the mediation continues, the more likely that Rajoelina may simply press ahead and hold some sort of elections on his own. While trying to coop Zafy and perhaps Ratsiraka, and leaving Ravalomanana in the cold, this could doom one round of reconciliation efforts and elections to failure. This is not acceptable to the SAG. In general he noted that the AU mediation team seems to be willing to accept any compromise to get to an agreement even if fatally flawed by compromised principles. The Ambassador enlisted Conradie's help in again opposing this approach at the next contact group meeting (perhaps later this week).

4. (C) Comment: Conradie is an astute observer of the situation. We hope that based on our conversations the SAG may weigh in to discourage what we see as Ravalomanana's apparent continuing belief that he can somehow return here with mercenary or other military support. Such a course, would in our view, be more likely to rally all the Malgache military against such an intervention force -- and is in any case, almost certain to fail. His continued invocation of such a possibility to his supporters encourages their intransigence and inflames extremists on both sides, making progress in the mediation very difficult.

End Comment

MARQUARDT

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Ravalomanana's Rumored Return With Mercenaries: Another Malagasy Fairytale

Origin Embassy Antananarivo (Madagascar)

Cable time Mon, 15 Jun 2009 14:18 UTC

VZCZCXRO9018 PP RUEHBZ RUEH DU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO DE
RUEHAN #0435/01 1661418 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 151418Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY
ANTANANARIVO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2538 INFO
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM
STUTTGART GE PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

Hide header C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000435 SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD E.O. 12958:
DECL: 11/04/2018

**SUBJECT: RAVALOMANANA'S RUMORED RETURN WITH MERCENARIES: ANOTHER
MALAGASY FAIRYTALE**

REF: ANTANANARIVO 428

Classified By: **POLOFF JEFF HULSE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.**

1. (C) SUMMARY: With negotiations at a standstill, rumors of former President Ravalomanana's imminent return -- with or without mercenary support -- have been slowly but steadily reinforced by media reports, opposition statements, and alleged military preparations by the transition government. While we are aware of his recent discussions around securing private security support (i.e. bodyguards) in South Africa, France, and the U.S., we have no credible indications that this project is advancing; indeed, warned through intermediaries that we are following his discussions and object to them, he passed the message to the Ambassador over the weekend that he is not seeking to engage mercenaries. Last week's unhelpful COMESA statement lending rhetorical support to SADC's lingering but equally feckless "military option" fueled Ravalomanana's supporters here to claim that he will return by June 26 (Malagasy National Day), by force if necessary. Leaders in the transition government are appealing to patriotism for support against the alleged arrival of "foreign mercenaries", reinforcing airports to repel them. This has been just the latest useful propaganda opportunity for extremists in both camps, following the successful and equally specious playing of the mercenary card by the HAT in February and March. The only real effect thus far has been to weaken support for the AU/UN negotiations, while Ravalomanana himself remains unable to return without a prior political solution. When he fails to appear, the HAT will have successfully "repelled" an attack, while it will be obvious that the pro-Ravalomanana side has again overplayed its hand. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) Ravalomanana has resided in South Africa since fleeing the country after the March 17 coup, and on June 3 was convicted in absentia to four years in jail and a USD 70 million fine for abuses of power. HAT President Andry Rajoelina has made clear his opposition to Ravalomanana's return under any circumstances, stating as recently as June 13 that there is "no possibility he will be allowed back" soon. Ravalomanana, however, has promised to return ever since departing: June 26 will be at least the fourth major "deadline" (following May 1, Easter, and Pentecost) that he will likely miss. Bolstering the rumors are recent reports misconstruing Ravalomanana's recent discussions with a U.S. security firm (over a personal security contract) as him seeking to hire foreign "mercenaries". There are also reports of similar discussions with South African and French entities.

3. (C) Whatever the truth of these rumors, the transition government has reinforced security (with an anti-aircraft battery) at the airport here, and reportedly is taking similar measures in Fort Dauphin (south) and Morondava (west coast). They also are appealing to Malagasy nationalism against the possibility of foreign mercenaries. With the national day on June 26 approaching, the HAT has capitalized on an uptick in flag-waving patriotism - made easier by the fact that Ravalomanana has apparently called on his own supporters to avoid using the Malagasy flag in their own rallies. HAT Minister of Defense Noel Rakotonandrasana has put the armed forces on "high alert", although this is not readily apparent even at Ivato airport here; media also reported that eight armored vehicles left Tana to assist in the south, but the reports are unconfirmed and rely on anonymous sources. Sareraka, a trusted advisor to Rajoelina, has declared that the HAT should "take care of (the Legalist protesters) who continue to call for COMESA and foreign

troops to bring (Ravalomanana) back". No action has been taken against the protesters, but the threat of Ravalomanana's return has given them an excuse to confront the remaining demonstrations more forcefully, after they had been largely out of reach for the last two months.

4. (C) The (pro-Ravalomanana) Legalists have been spreading the rumor as well, hoping that fear of a military confrontation will give them an edge in whatever process emerges from the current standoff at the negotiating table. While Legalist interlocutors recognize that foreign mercenaries would be anathema to most Malagasy, they are exploiting the threat in order to promote a deal with the HAT outside the context of the AU/UN negotiations. Alain Andriamiseza, leader of the non-TIM members of the Legalist movement, has attempted to sell Post on the idea of recognizing a HAT/Legalist deal as a means of avoiding the ANTANANARI 00000435 002 OF 002 violent return of Ravalomanana, but Post has deferred to the AU and UN mediators, and attempted to push all parties back towards the negotiations.

5. (C) COMMENT: Even long-time observers living here continue to be astounded by the degree to which alternative or parallel realities are created and exploited here for partisan political gain. The allegation of imminent mercenary landings is not a new play here, having worked like a charm for TGV's side -- with equally little substance behind it -- just before the coup, inflaming nationalist sentiment for his side. The discredited Malagasy military sees this as red flag it cannot ignore -- and a useful opportunity to enhance its credibility by "stopping" an invasion that will never occur anyway. Last week the Ambassador advised Ravalomanana, through three separate channels, against pursuing any return by force; he responded with denials on Friday via the same three channels. In any case, we have no credible evidence that he is planning a return at this time, and none of this charade has any impact on dialy life here. That said, partisan passions are rising with the approach of June 26, and both the HAT and the Legalists almost certainly will continue using the threat of his return to justify their actions. The international mediation process is likely to suffer most from their antics. We will continue monitoring the situation carefully for any sign of credibility, however unlikely that is, but a much greater concern at this time is how to salvage the negotiations (septel).

END COMMENT.

MARQUARDT

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Zambia Does Not Rule Out Military Intervention In Madagascar

Origin Embassy Lusaka (Zambia)

Cable time Wed, 24 Jun 2009 08:39 UTC

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCXRO7600 RR RUEHBZ RUEH DU RUEHMR RUEHRN DE RUEHLS #0450 1750839
ZNY CCCC ZZH R 240839Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE
WASHDC 7076 INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
COLLECTIVE RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0639

C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 000450

SIPDIS ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU, STATE FOR AF/S AND AF/E E.O. 12958: DECL:
06/23/2014

SUBJECT: ZAMBIA DOES NOT RULE OUT MILITARY INTERVENTION IN MADAGASCAR

REF: SECSTATE 63557

Classified By: **DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION MICHAEL KOPLOVSKY FOR REASONS 1. 4(B)
AND (D)**

1. (C) On June 23, emboffs met with Awa Lubundi, Zambian Foreign Ministry Africa Division, to discuss the points in the reftel demarche on Madagascar. He noted that SADC does not promote military intervention as a measure to advance political progress in Madagascar, yet SADC remains open to employing such an alternative after all consensual negotiation efforts are exhausted. He also inquired how the USG might respond to possible SADC military intervention in Madagascar. Our response reiterated that the United States advocates peaceful resolutions to this crisis. Although Lubundi conceded that sending the SADC brigade was something SADC leaders considered during their June 20 summit in Johannesburg, he described it as an "unrealistic" option.

2. (C) According to the Lubundi, SADC's reticence on military intervention stems from its previous failed attempt to intercede in Lesotho during 1998. He confided that SADC leaders lacked confidence that a SADC brigade would be well received by the Malagasy people and, therefore, was likely to fail. He took the point regarding the need to push for elections and refrain from reinstating Marc Ravalomanana. Lubundi's comments reflected little GRZ urgency for immediate elections. He noted that SADC would endorse an interim government led, for instance, by the Head of Madagascar's Senate until elections are underway.

BOOTH

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Madagascar: Ravalomanana Seeking Usg Help He Won't Get

Origin Embassy Antananarivo (Madagascar)

Cable time Thu, 25 Jun 2009 12:58 UTC

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

P 251258Z JUN 09

FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2592

INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

CJTF HOA PRIORITY

DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY

DIA WASHDC PRIORITY

HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

NSC WASHDC PRIORITY SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000476

E.O. 12958:

DECL: 06/25/2019

SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: RAVALOMANANA SEEKING USG HELP HE WON'T GET

Classified By: **AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E**

1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with the ambassador in Johannesburg on June 22, former president Marc Ravalomanana requested USG help with his desired return to Madagascar and stressed the key role he must play as head of state in returning the country to "constitutional order". The ambassador responded that such assistance from the USG will not be forthcoming, and advised him instead not to return to Madagascar for now, and even to consider returning after the next election. Forcing the issue would endanger his security and risk inflaming the situation in Madagascar, the ambassador told him. Ravalomanana insisted that he remains very popular, including within the army, a view the ambassador questioned, and does not share. In separate meetings with his aides, the ambassador was more direct in stressing the need for Ravalomanana to stay away and not make trouble. His aides insist he is not/not on the verge of returning, contrary to continuing rumors and public statements. His aides are organizing separate activities, some trying to create an entente among Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy (and excluding Rajoelina), while another aide is pushing for a reconciliation speech on the June 26 National Day. End summary.

2. (C) Ambassador Marquardt traveled on June 22 to Johannesburg at the request of President Ravalomanana, meeting with him for one hour that evening in his suburban Sandton office suite. Also attending were Malagasy Ambassador to South Africa -- his anointed "Special

Envoy" -- Denis Andriamandroso and Capetown Consul General Bary Rafatrolaza, a Malagasy parliamentarian-turned-diplomat. The other close aide working with Ravalomanana in Johannesburg is former SADC Secretary General Prega Ramsamy, who joined the conversation late. Ravalomanana's message to the ambassador was that he wishes to return to Madagascar to resume his previous role as head of state and seeks USG assistance in making this happen. He is concerned that failure to do so will send a message that "coups are OK", which in turn will encourage others to foment them in the future. Ravalomanana expressed surprise that the ambassador was, he had heard, opposed to his return.

3. (C) The ambassador responded that it would be nice if the political and security situation in Madagascar permitted Ravalomanana to resume his previous role, as that would be the quickest way to re-establish "constitutional order." However, the political situation remains highly charged, and his return, in the ambassador's view, would pose grave risks to his personal security while potentially re-igniting political passions. He should understand that the USG therefore will not provide such assistance. Furthermore, the ambassador advised that he should abandon his intention to return to Madagascar at this time, delaying his return until things settle -- and perhaps even waiting until after presidential elections while taking a longer-term view of his future in Madagascar. If Ravalomanana insists on running, this may induce Rajoelina to run as well (having first changed the constitution to make himself eligible), none of which would be desirable, the ambassador said. The ambassador continued that, after Ravalomanana's foreign minister recently proposed this idea to him in Antananarivo, he had explored with various other parties the notion of Ravalomanana playing a "Queen of England" role during the transition -- and found that no one (outside Ravalomanana's inner circle) at all interested. The ambassador said there is a continuing problem of trust toward Ravalomanana, with no one believing him capable of playing such a passive role.

4. (C) Ravalomanana was clearly disappointed with the ambassador's views, but he remained engaged, actually admitted making "many mistakes," and was mostly in listening mode -- a marked change from the past. He raised the recent SADC Summit, welcomed the entry of Chissano into the mediation, and opined that SADC is still behind him. The ambassador told him, based on word from SADC governments, that the military option was now entirely off the table, which is a good thing as force would never solve this problem. SADC's engagement -- now under South African not Swazi leadership -- is indeed a good thing, agreed the ambassador, but now the time has come for serious compromises on all sides, including his. The next step appears to be the convening of face-to-face talks somewhere in SADC by Chissano; Ravalomanana responded that he "had no problem" with meeting the others and is, in fact, in frequent touch with Ratsiraka and Zafy. He also admitted having recent contacts with TGV's Chief of Staff Zazah, who he said was considering a visit to Johannesburg on behalf of TGV. (Note: We subsequently learned that TGV sent former Prime Minister Norbert Lala Ratsirahonana to Jo'Burg on June 25 to see Ravalomanana.)

5. (C) Ravalomanana said he is deeply opposed to TGV running the transition, even if TGV will not be a candidate in the next election. "I should run it instead," he insisted. The ambassador asked how this could happen, to which there was no clear answer. Ravalomanana insisted that he remains popular in Madagascar, including within the army, and that "the people want me back." He went on at some length about deteriorating conditions in Madagascar since he left, complaining that programs like MCA had been lost and blaming TGV for human rights violations, intimidation, arrest, and other negative developments. He cited the CAPSAT mutineers and HAT member Alain Ramarason and his "militia" who are making the rounds terrorizing political opponents and stealing outright from wealthy Malagasy citizens. Ravalomanana also expressed deep concern about the possibility of recognition of the HAT. The ambassador reassured him that the USG will never recognize the HAT and that few other governments would consider doing so either.

6. (C) On June 23, the ambassador held separate meetings, first alone with Ramsamy, and later with Andriamandroso and Rafatrolaza, to reinforce his messages the night before to Ravalomanana. They all seemed genuinely interested in understanding current conditions in Madagascar that prevent Ravalomanana from returning. Ramsamy especially appeared to accept the ambassador's judgment that it would be very unwise to try to return, and said he would urge the president not to do so. Instead, he said he was drafting a "reconciliation speech" for Ravalomanana to give on or around the June 26 National Day holiday; this idea was presented to Ravalomanana over the weekend by UN mediator Tiebile Drame, who also visited him in Jo'Burg.

7. (C) Andriamandroso and Ratrafolaza spoke of a plan they are already engaged in to bring Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka, and Zafy together into some sort of reconciliation that would, at least initially, exclude Rajoelina. The ambassador cautioned against anything that would be exclusive as consensus will be required to resolve this crisis. In fact, the plan smacked much more of being a partisan political manoeuvre than any real reconciliation. Andriamandroso also advocated including the CAPSAT mutineers in the political dialogue, an idea the ambassador strongly opposed. The ambassador stressed to the two diplomats that Ravalomanana, in fact, has become quite unpopular in Madagascar -- partly for having helped create the conditions for the coup; he should not overestimate popular enthusiasm for his return, which is not shared even among some of his closest former loyalists, the ambassador said. Instead, many Malagasy want the former president to play a conciliatory "father of the nation" role, would urge him to back off his threatened return, expect him to negotiate to protect his safety and his family's and to seek to safeguard his extensive (and very vulnerable) business interests, He may well have a future political role to play in Madagascar, but not by returning and running for office now, the ambassador advised.

8. (C) Ambassador's Comment and Recommended Next Step: I was intentionally blunt and

direct with Ravalomanana and his advisors in an effort to talk him off an unrealistic and potentially harmful set of objectives; as before, Ravalomanana is getting a narrow range of "soft" advice and needed to hear this message. I agree with UN mediator Drame that Ravalomanana is now a rather different, somewhat off-balance person than he was just three months ago when he left. SADC's new position and leadership role were still sinking in as he may still imagine support for him that is no longer there. Andriamandroso said Ravalomanana has been invited to Sirte by Qadhafi and that he definitely will attend the AU Summit. I recommend that Ambassador Carson meet him briefly there to make the USG position even clearer before Chissano convenes the next phase of the mediation (presumably shortly after Sirte). Should such a meeting occur Ambassador Carson should stress three points: that the United States does not believe that the return of Ravalomanana to Madagascar would be helpful any time before a consensual agreement is reached; that Ravalomanana should encourage reconciliation by ceasing his ongoing efforts to block progress with the international mediation effort; and that -- if by then he still has not done so -- he should make a conciliatory public statement supporting the mediation.

MARQUARDT

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Un dossier historique de Jeannot RAMAMBAZAFY – 18 février 2012